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"Seeing Through the Invisible" - research materials

 

Seeing Through the Invisible: Radiation Spikes Detected in Chernobyl During the Russian Invasion Show Possible Evidence of Fabrication

After many months of intense research, I'm finally releasing the paper that contains full technical details and collected evidence. I presented this research at BlackHat USA 2023 a few days ago.

Kim Zetter published on Wired a fascinating story about this research. She also wrote a piece on her Substack that brings additional details.

I really appreciate the interest this research has generated among different people, also outside the security world. Hopefully, some day we will eventually see an official investigation into these events, which is what everyone is asking for.

Paper

(PDF) https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sxg7Do9DVs6xquv-j8gBUgN4RUZkMG2N/view?usp=sharing 

SHA256 c143a35f7f6c43a80b21883dabe2e96edc1a724ac1b8c1061c1e318abd0dda38

(Preview is not possible due to the size of the file)

Web Version

https://www.reversemode.com/2024/01/what-really-happened-in-chernobyl.html








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