TL;DR This post describes the conditions and technical details that enable Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) attacks against Signal when Censorship Circumvention is enabled. However, despite the ability to decrypt TLS traffic between the target and the Signal backend, the end-to-end encryption (E2EE) scheme implemented by Signal prevents attackers from accessing user content such as conversations, audios, attachments, etc., which remains securely encrypted. In simple terms, enabling Censorship Circumvention does not affect the E2EE layer. The resources required to exploit these issues are limited to nation-states. Unless you’re either a high-value individual (or part of their inner circle) for a nation-state/state-sponsored actors, or a citizen/journalist/activist in an authoritarian country that is closely aligned with others possessing, let’s say, certain expertise, you’re realistically nowhere near being a potential target. Censorship circumvention may not be perfect, but it is vi...